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judgment-of personal responsibility for one's own choices and behavior-is lacking.
In short, Hewlett and others now writing in a comparable vein
never consider that the "double-bind" on women Hewlett describes-the multiple burdens, the tensions and conflicts-may not
be the result of society's failures, or the clashing demands of feminists and conservatives, but an inescapable dilemma, part of the
human condition generally, and the female condition particularly.
None of this, I hasten to add, means that parental leaves and other
measures are necessarily bad. Women do marry and have children;
they also work. Various proposals may be sound. But they must be
evaluated realistically, in terms of probable economic and social
benefits and costs, for specific groups and for the society as a whole;
and they must not be made to seem the answer to inner problems or
conflicts, unanalyzed and even unexpressed, which they will not
solve. Hewlett's book provides neither an economic or policy
analysis of specific proposals, nor an illumination of the dilemmas
of the woman who wants a career and a family. These dilemmas
have little to do with parental leaves and day-care centers. True,
the book is an advance over much feminist writing, which ignores
family altogether, or sees it as something from which women should
be freed; but it is a very small advance. Feminism has barely begun
to ask the deeper questions that need to be asked.

THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, VOL. I,
PARTS 1 AND 2. Edited by Maeva Marcus' and James R.
Perry.2 New York: Columbia University Press. 1985. Pp.
lxxii, 599; xvi, 400 (consecutively paginated). $95.
John P. Roche 3
This is the first of seven projected volumes of original sources
on the Supreme Court's first decade. It focuses on appointments to
the Court and the more technical aspects of its procedures. Two
more preparatory volumes are anticipated--one on the background
of article Ill, and the third on the circuit court activities of the Justices-and then four dealing in extenso with the Court's decisions.
I. Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University.
2. Research scholar specializing in early court records.
3. Olin Distinguished Professor of Civilization and Foreign Affairs, The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
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At a time when theologians seem to have cornered the market on
constitutional commentary, converting the framers into Platonic
"Guardians" of various esoteric persuasions, this enterprise should
help those of us concerned with "mere facts" in our task (in Walton
Hamilton's phrase) of "promoting the Framers from immortality to
mortality." These two books are invaluable, but alas they skirt
most substantive questions.4
A detailed review is impossible, but certain key themes stand
out. Admittedly these works bear some resemblance to an annotated telephone directory-the editors have tracked down basic biographical material on everyone cited-but this sort of research is a
God-send to scholars like myself who have been arguing for yearsroughly forty in my case-that the Constitution was written by a
consummate group of practicing politicians, not by a seminar of
political philosophers.
As one reads the biographical footnotes, particularly as lawyers line up for admission to the Supreme Court bar, two impressions emerge: first, the personal interrelationships (everyone
appears to have been someone else's cousin, nephew, or brother-inlaw); and second, the breadth of political experience in what was
the world's most democratic political ambience. Once in a moment
of masochism I set out to total the years of legislative, executive,
and judicial experience possessed by the men who gathered in Philadelphia to draft the Constitution; I quit when I reached 1300!
Indeed, what emerged in the American provinces, later states,
between 1765 and 1795, when the party system began to undermine
it, was the most cohesive and talented political class in our history.
Some members (e.g., James Otis) died; others joined (e.g., Alexander Hamilton and Albert Gallatin, to pick two immigrants); but the
amazing solidity of this body of so-called "revolutionaries"s was
demonstrated by the absence of defectors to the Crown when the
heat was turned on in the early 1770's. Only one leading American
spokesman, Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania, opted for the Crown
after the defeat of his proposal for an Anglo-American union by the
Continental Congress on October 22, 1774.
There were internal disagreements. Patrick Henry automatically opposed anything, including the handiwork of the Constitutional Convention, if he suspected Thomas Jefferson, (via his clone
4. E.g., was there no correspondence on the cases, culminating with Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which rejected the states' sovereign immunity and led to
the virtually instant passage of the eleventh amendment?
5. See Roche, The Strange Case of the "Revolutionary" Establishment, in SENTENCED
TO LIFE (1974).
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James Madison), had inspired it. Governor George Clinton of New
York had parallel views of an enterprise promoted by Alexander
Hamilton. The symbolic status of George Washington, an authentic "father-figure," and Benjamin Franklin rallied the bulk of this
group to the new Constitution. How could it be a monarchist plot
if the American "Cincinnatus," who returned to Mount Vernon
and excoriated admirers who wished him to become a military dictator, had presided over its accomplishments?
Washington, it might be noted, has been underrated by posterity. In Part 2 of this volume we see him at work choosing Justices
and dealing with disappointed candidates and ticklish situations.
On October 8, 1789, John Jay wrote Matthew Ridley, who had
pushed Samuel Chase of Maryland for a position on the first Court,
"whether if it [the letter] had arrived sooner, it would have produced the desired Effect, I know not-The Presidents (sic) personal
Knowledge of distinguished Characters throughout the States rendering it unnecessary for him to require or depend upon the Information or Recommendation of others. . . ."
In 1791 we find him dealing with a delicate situation in South
Carolina after the resignation of John Rutledge as Chief Justice.
That state suffered from a surfeit of federalist magnates. Probably
none of them really wanted to serve on the Court because of the low
salary, the need to move and abandon a law practice, and, possibly
the greatest deterrent, the need to ride circuit, a horrendous physical burden given the poor roads and remote locations of some
courts. (Rutledge had resigned as Chief Justice to return to the
same post in the South Carolina judiciary.) However, South Carolina magnates were proud men who wanted the privilege of turning
down an offer, and perhaps picking up points for being the first to
tum it down.
Washington dealt with this in distinctive fashion. On May 24,
1791, he sent Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and his brother-in-law
Edward Rutledge a joint confidential1etter inquiring whether either
of them wanted the job, if so "which of you?" It worked like a
charm: on June 12 came the joint reply, an effusive statement of
thanks for the "Confidence with which you have treated us" and a
polite refusal. He was the master both of a chilling note to persistent job-seekers, and of a warmth in personal relations demonstrated in a semi-apology to James Madison, whose advice he had
sought on the Virginia judgeship situation. "I am very troublesome," he wrote, "but you must excuse me.-Ascribe it to friendship and confidence, and you will do Justice to my motives ....
Yours ever GW."
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To return to the main line of discussion, what these volumes
document is the delightful challenge of establishing a new system of
government, with the focus on the judicial department. There is a
wonderful atmosphere of improvisation about the first years: the
Court's first Clerk, John Tucker, for example, was moonlighting
from his regular post as Clerk of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.6 He began the official minutes of the Court, which he
persisted in designating the "Supreme Judicial Court" of the United
States! John Jay was offered his choice of the Chief Justiceship or of
continuing his position as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, held under
the Articles of Confederation. The newly appointed Secretary of
the Senate, Samuel A. Otis, commented wryly in a letter that "The
Keeper of the Tower [Jay] is waiting to see which Salary is best, that
of Lord Chief Justice or Secretary of State." When Jay opted for
the Chief Justiceship, Thomas Jefferson-then our Minister to
France-was named Secretary of State so Jay held both positions
for six months until Jefferson settled in New York. (John Marshall
later displayed an identical respect for the separation of powers, but
for only six weeks.)
Our recently invented Doctrine of Judicial Political Virginity
would surely have shocked the Founding Fathers. In 1792, for instance, John Jay ran for Governor of New York with no apparent
qualms about retaining his status as Chief Justice. If asked he probably would have said, "Why leave a good secure job until you know
you have a better?," but interestingly enough there seems to have
been no serious criticism. In 1795, he tried again, this time against
New York's Chancellor Robert R. Livingston (who also ran from
his office, which he retained until President Jefferson named him
Minister to France in 1801). It was not until the political class was
fractured by differing views of the national interest (Hamilton's
commercial mercantilism versus Jefferson's agrarian utopia), a split
for which the 1795 Jay Treaty with Britain served as the catalyst,
that a Supreme Court Justice, Samuel Chase, was savaged by the
Jeffersonian press for his Maryland efforts on behalf of John Adams
in the election of 1800.
Jay's Treaty (which he negotiated before he left the bench)
brought to the surface a whole set of latent disputes about the nation's future. What developed was ostensibly a brawl between the
pro-British and pro-French wings of the political class, but I believe
(based on contemporary evidence, 1 but beyond the purview of this
6.
7.

The terms did not overlap.

See the acute English and French commentators' statements cited in J.

FREEDOM's FETTERS

12 {1956).

SMITH,
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essay) that domestic questions were at the root of the split. It is
sufficient for our purposes to state that with the end of George
Washington's tenure in sight, Jay's Treaty triggered a political
earthquake that eventually reached about 9.0 on the Richter Scale.
Ironically in the light of recent cant about excluding ideological criticism from the evaluation of Supreme Court nominees, the
first victim of this "faction" fight was poor old John Rutledge,
whom Washington had named in a recess appointment to succeed
John Jay as Chief Justice. Rutledge, a 1760 "graduate" of London's
Middle Temple and provincial attorney-general, in 1775 became a
leader of the patriots in South Carolina, was first President of that
State and the framer who with Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut
helped devise the Great (or "Connecticut") Compromise, and had
served on the first Supreme Court. If ever a candidate seemed like a
sure bet, it was Rutledge.
But a funny thing happened on the way from this recess appointment to Senate confirmation: the word was spread by Alexander Hamilton's myrmidons that Rutledge was non compos mentis!
The proof? A speech he had delivered at St. Michael's Church in
Charleston (undoubtedly before he knew of his nomination) on July
16, 1795, in which he had vigorously denounced Jay's Treaty as
contrary to American interests. This touched off a political firestorm. Secretary of Treasury Oliver Wolcott, Jr. was gentle when
he wrote Hamilton that, "A driveller & fool [has been] appointed
Chief Justice," but William Bradford, Jr., compensated for this
moderation a few days later when he told Hamilton, "The crazy
speech of Mr. Rutledge joined to certain information that he is daily
sinking into debility of mind & body, will probably prevent him to
(sic) receiving the appointment .... "s On August 5, 1795, Hamilton himself took up the cudgel. Writing as "Camillus" in the New
York Argus, he noted "The ravagings of anger and pride are mistaken for the suggestions of honor. Thus we are told in a delirium
of rage by a gentleman of South Caroline [that Jay's Treaty sold out
American interests.]" He did throw in a footnote suggesting the
pain he suffered in criticizing Rutledge and added "I regret the occasion and the necessity of animadversion."
President Washington, obviously baffled and embarrassed by
the whole embroglio, kept trying to find out from Secretary of State
Edmund Randolph what the precise facts were, but the latter was
not very helpful. Ironically in the light of the fact that two weeks
later he was to resign when accused by Washington (at Hamilton's
8.

!d. at 775.
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instigation)9 of accepting French bribes, Randolph's only contribution was to twist Hamilton's dagger: "No answer," he reported to
the President on August 5, "has been received from Mr. Rutledge;
but the reports of his attachment to his bottle, his puerility, and
extravagances together with a variety of indecorums and imprudencies multiply daily .... " The drive was on to prevent Senate
confirmation. Rutledge was not without defenders in the antiTreaty (shortly to be known as Jeffersonian) press, so the battle
raged from August through early December.
Let Vice President John Adams, writing Abigail, summarize
the finale of this classic exercise of non-ideological evaluation: "The
Senate have refused their Consent to the Nomination of Mr. Rutledge. I hope that Chief Justices at least will learn from this to be
cautious how they go to popular Meetings especially unlawful assemblies to Spout Reflections and excite opposition to the legal Acts
of Constitutional Authority." Thomas Jefferson provided another
perspective when he wrote William Giles "the rejection of Mr. Rutledge by the Senate is a bold thing, because they cannot pretend any
objection to him but his disapprobation of the treaty. It is of course
a declaration that they will receive none but tories hereafter into
any department of the government."
So much for the Doctrine of Judicial Political Virginity. As
indicated earlier, the Rutledge episode was the harbinger of the
emergence of a bi-polar party system in the Adams administration,
a division so bitter that at one time or another both President Adams, the titular leader of the federalists, and Vice President Jefferson, the head of the anti-federalists, (neither an apocalyptic) feared
the outbreak of civil war. 10 Curiously, very few items in this work
touch on the acute constitutional crisis of 1798-1800. Perhaps the
Sedition Act cases (in which the Jeffersonians argued interestingly
that the Sedition Act of 1798 violated states' rights with no mention
of the first amendment) have been reserved for the volume of Circuit Court activities as none reached the Supreme Court. Still it is
surprising that, with one exception, no correspondence on the internecine conflict merited inclusion here. Justice Chase's notorious
partisan addresses to federal grand juries on Circuit-which led to
9. In my judgment, the evidence is overwhelming that Randolph was framed by the
Hamilton Cabinet clique (Wolcott and Pickering-respectively Secretaries of the Treasury
and of War) because the Secretary of State was considered a Francophile. The best recent
summation is Tachau, George Washington and the Reputation of Edmund Randolph, 73
J.A.H. 15 (1986).
10. John Adams wrote later that he feared "a civil war," cited in J. CHARLES, THE
0R!Gl~S OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 135 (1956). Thomas Jefferson: "A final dissolution of all bonds, civil & social, appeared imminent." /d. at 118.
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his later impeachment (the Senate failed to convict)-must have
had some ripple effect at the top level. But as the editors patently
could not include everything, we shall have to wait.
The one substantive exception was the conspiracy that Alexander Hamilton tried to organize in 1801 to prevent Jefferson or Burr
from becoming President. Space prevents full examination except
to note that Jefferson and Madison were not suffering from paranoia
when they attributed this design to the hard-core federalists. The
mechanism was to be a "Grand Commission" consisting of six Senators, six representatives, and chaired by the Chief Justice, which
would validate the votes of the electors when the Electoral College
assembled. The hardly covert assumption underlying this was that
various electors would have their credentials challenged-as occurred in the contested election of 1876.11 The Ross Bill passed the
Senate, died in the House, leaving Jefferson and Burr to fight it out
in the federalist dominated House of Representatives. 1801 was a
busy year!
In particular it was busy in the waning months of the Adams
administration as Congress passed the Judiciary Act establishing a
clutch of sixteen new Circuit Judges, shortly to be defenestrated by
Jefferson's Judiciary Act of 1802, and relieving the Justices from
riding Circuit. Adams's big problem was the vacant Chief Justiceship: Ellsworth, who replaced the rejected Rutledge, was sick in
France and resigned. Adams immediately offered it to Jay, but the
latter had had enough of politics and retired to spend the remaining
twenty-eight years of his life as a gentleman farmer. With the clock
running down and the federalist Senate soon to be replaced by a
Jeffersonian one, Adams had to act. Act he did. As John Marshall
recollected the event in 1827,
When I waited on the President [in January, 1801] with Mr. Jays letter declining
the appointment [sent to Marshall in his capacity as Secretary of State] he said
thoughtfully 'Who shall I nominate now?' I replied that I could not tell, as I supposed that his objection to Judge Paterson [based on Paterson's siding with Hamilton to oppose the dispatch of a peace mission to France in 1799] remained. He said
in a decided tone 'I shall not nominate him.' After a moments hesitation he said 'I
believe I must nominate you.'12

Marshall was confirmed by the Senate and a new era in American
constitutionalism began.
This essay has digressed, but art reflects life and the volume
II. The Commission set up to adjudicate contests in 1877 was similar to the one proposed in 1800 by Senator Ross except that it included five Supreme Court Justices. I have
been unable to discover any genetic link.
12. Further evidence is supplied in M. DAUER, THE ADAMS FEDERALISTS 244, 251
(1953).
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under review necessarily digresses, and marvelously so. From the
outset, American constitutional law has been a contact sport, and
all fact-mongers can look forward to the early completion of this
series.
However, at the risk of seeming churlish, I must point out two
errors in the commentary, one non clericale privilegium, the other
trivial. To write "The Senate ratified the Jay Treaty on June 24,
1795" (p. 781) is really inexcusable, particularly since later in the
same footnote Washington's reluctance to ratify was pointed out.
The second, which only those who have read the state debates on
the ratification of the Constitution would catch, is in the brief biography of Richard Henry Lee of Westmoreland County, Virginia,
namely, the assertion that he opposed the ratification in the Virginia
Convention. In fact, "Mr. Lee of Westmoreland" was the federalist
hatchet-man who specialized in flaying Patrick Henry. He voted
for the Constitution; another of the ubiquitous Lees, "H. Lee of
Bourbon," voted against.I3
But all in all an outstanding contribution to scholarship.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY. By Eva R. Rubin.' Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press. 1986. Pp. 251. $35.00.
Judith T. Younger2

By calling her book, "The Supreme Court and the American
Family," Professor Eva Rubin arouses our curiosity. Her title suggests that the Supreme Court and the American family are somehow related. In fact, they have very little to do with each other.
American families are not regulated by the federal government
through its courts or Congress. They are regulated by the states
through their legislatures. Of course states, in regulating families,
may not tread on constitutionally protected rights; and the Supreme
Court of the United States is the ultimate arbiter of when the states
have overstepped permissible bounds. This is not a close connection, and Professor Rubin knows it. She tells us that "family law
13. But see 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 655 (2d ed. 1891), and my discussion of the Virginia Convention in Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. PoL. SCI. REV.
799 (1961).
I. Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Administration, North Carolina
State University.
2. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.

